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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
DOUGLAS CARTER, 
Defendant-Apellant. 
Case No. 860063 
Category No, 1 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether this Court should grant rehearing because it 
overlooked statutory and case law supporting the State 
introducing at the penalty phase of a capital case statutory 
aggravation that was not proved at guilt phase. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and 
sentenced him to death. This Court affirmed defendant's 
conviction in State v. Carter, case no. 860063 (filed May 12, 
1989). Due to the possibility that an erroneous jury instruction 
on one of the aggravating circumstances at guilt phase affected 
the jury's ability to reach a fair and impartial decision on the 
penalty, this Court remanded the case to the District Court for a 
new penalty hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State agrees with the facts set forth in the 
Court'8 opinion contained in Appendix A of this petition. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 294, 11 P. 512 (1886), 
this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a 
petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown a the time of the hearing. 
(Citation omitted.) In Cumminqs v. Nelson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 
129 P. 619, 624 (1913), the Court stated: 
to make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases.. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this Court. 
The argument portion of this brief will demonstrate that, based 
on these standards, the State's petition for rehearing is 
properly before the Court and should be granted. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The opinion in this case implies that the State may not 
introduce evidence of statutory aggravation at the penalty phase 
that was not proven at the guilt phase of a capital trial. This 
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implication is contrary to the capital sentencing statute that 
allows the State to introduce all relevant aggravating evidence 
including evidence as to the nature of the crime and evidence of 
aggravation defined in the first degree murder statute. There is 
no case law supporting a finding that the State must offer and 
prove aggravating factors at guilt phase in order to rely on it 
at penalty phase simply because the factor is one of the 
enumerated statutory aggravating factors. Indeed, the case law 
supports the State's position and justifies a rehearing in this 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE MAY INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF STATUTORY 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AT PENALTY PHASE 
THAT WERE NOT INTRODUCED OR PROVEN AT GUILT 
PHASE OF A CAPITAL TRIAL. 
In State v. Carter, case no. 860063, slip op. at 15 
(filed May 12, 1989) this Court stated: 
we remand for new sentencing proceedings. In 
doing so, it is to be observed that in State 
v. Tuttle, decided after the submission of 
this case, we also discussed the application 
of subsection (l)(q)* However, that case 
does not apply here since we conclude that 
the jury was not properly instructed on the 
subsection (l)(q) aggravating circumstance at 
the guilt phase and it would be improper to 
make reference to that statutory aggravating 
circumstance in the penalty phase on remand. 
(Footnotes omitted, emphasis added.) While the State agrees that 
the jury was improperly instructed at guilt phase on the (l)(q) 
aggravating circumstance, the State disagrees with this Court's 
implication, without citation to any authority, in the 
-3-
highlighted portion of the excerpt above that the penalty phase 
jury cannot be properly instructed and requested to consider 
statutory aggravating circumstances not proven at guilt phase. 
If allowed to stand, this misstatement of the law will affect not 
only the penalty rehearing in this case, but may impact future 
capital cases. Because this Court either overlooked or 
misinterpreted existing statutory and case law regarding what 
evidence is admissible at penalty phase, rehearing should be 
granted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) (Supp. 1988) which 
establishes the sentencing procedures for capital cases provides, 
in pertinent part: 
In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may 
be presented as to any matter the court deems 
relevant to sentence, including but not 
limited to the nature and circumstances of 
the crime, the defendant's character, 
background, history, mental and physical 
condition, and any other facts in aggravation 
or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence 
the court deems to have probative force may 
be received regardless of its admissibility 
under the exclusionary rules of evidence. 
The state's attorney and the defendant shall 
be permitted to present argument for or 
against sentence of death. Aggravating 
circumstances shall include those as outlined 
in 76-5-202. . . • 
This section contemplates a wide-ranging sentencing hearing that 
is not limited in scope to the statutory aggravating factors 
proven at guilt phase. A practice the United States Supreme 
Court has approved. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 
(1976) (far ranging argument in capital sentencing hearing wisely 
utilized - preferable not to impose restrictions). The State may 
introduce €*vidence under § 76-3-207 "including but not limited to 
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the nature and circumstances of the crime" and including the 
factors listed in Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (Supp. 1988). 
Theoretically, the State could choose at the outset of 
a capital case to charge and to prove at guilt phase only one of 
several existing statutory aggravating circumstances and reserve 
the remaining statutory aggravation for the penalty phase. 
Nothing in the language of the statute limits the statutory 
factors that may be considered by the jury regarding the penalty 
to those relied on at guilt phase. As this Court stated in State 
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1259 (Utah 1988), "[t]he only 
restriction on the admission of [relevant aggravating] evidence 
is that it must not be unfairly prejudicial to the accused." The 
Court further noted that a capital defendant may discover the 
nature of the aggravating factors the State intends to rely on at 
the penalty hearing by filing a request for a bill of 
particulars. Icl. at 1261. This statement presupposes that there 
will be evidence presented at penalty phase that is not charged 
in the information and, therefore, not proven as an element of 
the crime of first degree murder at guilt phase. Moreover, this 
Court held that adequate notice of statutory aggravating factors 
is provided by S 76-5-202 in the face of a capital defendant's 
claim that he was not given adequate notice of the aggravation 
relied upon in his capital trial. Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 
816, 822 (Utah 1980). Thus, a capital defendant cannot claim 
that allowing the State to reserve some statutory aggravation for 
the penalty phase denies him notice of what factors the State 
intends to rely on. 
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There is no case law establishing that, merely because 
a factor is statutorily defined as aggravating, the State may 
only rely on it at penalty phase if it was proven to exist beyond 
a reasonable doubt at guilt phase. All the State is required to 
prove at guilt phase is the existence of one statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Carter, slip 
op. at 13. If for one reason or another the State chooses not to 
charge one or more other statutory aggravating factors, the use 
of these factors should not be precluded at penalty phase merely 
because they are statutorily defined and may also be an 
independent basis for a finding of guilt. 
The Legislature has determined that the factors defined 
in S 76-5-202 are aggravating and warrant consideration for the 
death penalty. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 571 (Utah 1987). 
In determining whether the State should be allowed to present 
evidence of these statutory factors at the penalty phase even 
where the factors were not the basis for a determination of 
guilt, this Court should consider that one of the goals of the 
criminal code is to M[p]rescribe penalties which are 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses,M Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-1-104(3) (1978), and that "[a]ll provisions of th[e] code 
. . . shall be construed according to the fair import of their 
terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and 
general purposes of S 76-1-104" Utah Code Ann. $ 76-1-106 
(1978). Where the Legislature has already determined that the 
factors enumerated in S 76-5-202 are always considered to be 
aggravating, the jury must be BO instructed. To do otherwise 
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would be to ignore the general purposes of the code. Absent 
instructions on all of the statutory aggravating circumstances 
the State alleges exist, the jury cannot prescribe a penalty 
which is proportionate to the crime. 
Even though the jury at defendant's guilt phase was 
improperly instructed on the (l)(q) aggravating circumstance, the 
State should not be precluded from proving, if it is able, the 
aggravation at penalty phase and offering a correct instruction. 
The effect of this Court's decision not to rely on the (l)(q) 
circumstance in affirming the first degree murder conviction is 
as if the jury were never instructed on (l)(q). Defendant would 
not, therefore, be prejudiced by an instruction that would allow 
the jury, for purposes of penalty only, to consider the (l)(q) 
factor. 
The State is not suggesting that the new penalty jury 
would be instructed that the (l)(q) aggravating circumstance was 
found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt by the guilt phase jury. 
They would merely be instructed that the Legislature has 
determined that it is a statutory aggravating circumstance that 
they may consider in determining the appropriate penalty and 
deciding whether the totality of the aggravation outweighs the 
totality of the mitigation. Of course, the State would still 
have to marshal facts at the penalty phase supporting the 
application of the aggravating factor# as correctly defined. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Zant v. Stephens, 
462 U.S. 862 (1983), found that a capital sentencing jury was not 
prejudiced when it considered an aggravating factor at the 
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sentencing hearing that was not proper at guilt phase because it 
failed to narrow, for the purposes of guilt, the pool of 
murderers eligible for the death penalty. Nevertheless, the 
Court stated that the factor could be considered for sentencing 
since it was also listed as a factor bearing on sentence in a 
separate sentencing statute. Id. at 886. The Court had 
previously found that Georgia's capital procedures, like Utah's, 
performed the narrowing function at guilt phase by requiring a 
finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance to 
convict of first degree murder. Id. at 879. 
The result in Stephens was effectively that a statutory 
aggravating circumstance that was not the basis for the 
determination of guilt was used by the jury for sentencing. This 
is similar to what the State argues should occur in this case. 
Defendant has already been convicted of first degree murder under 
one valid statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The invalidation of the (l)(q) instruction is as if it 
was never introduced or proven at guilt phase because this Court 
affirmed defendant's conviction solely on the other statutory 
aggravating factor. The jury will now consider, only for 
purposes of sentencing all appropriate aggravation described in a 
separate sentencing statute. The sentencing statute specifically 
refers back to the factors listed in the first degree murder 
statute as also being appropriate for sentencing. Because there 
is no limitation to the aggravation that was the basis for the 
finding of guilt, the jury should be allowed to consider whether 
the facts of the crime were Especially heinous, atrocious, 
cruel, or exceptionally depraved.11 
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In fact, defendant will have an advantage that Stephens 
did not: Defendant's sentencing jury will not be the same jury 
that heard the erroneous instruction defining the (l)(q) 
circumstance. If it can be harmless error to allow the penalty 
imposed by a previously tainted jury to stand, then it cannot be 
prejudicial to allow a new jury, properly instructed, to consider 
statutorily defined aggravation. Because the first degree murder 
sentencing statute and relevant case law support the State 
introducing at penalty phase evidence in aggravation not 
introduced or proven at guilt phase, the implication in this case 
to the contrary is inaccurate. A rehearing should be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to grant rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^//l day of May, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
/ / SANDRA L. <£<K)GREri 
'-^  Assistant Attorney General 
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EXHIBIT A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter* 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Douglas Carter, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 860063 
F I L E D 
May 12, 1989 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
Attorneys; Gary Weight, James P. Rupper, Thomas H. Means, 
Provo, for defendant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff 
Lionel H. Frankel, Salt Lake City, for the ACLU 
HALL# Chief Justice: 
On February 27, 1985, Eva Oleson vas found dead in 
her home. Following an investigation, defendant vas arrested 
in Nashville, Tennessee, and charged with the murder. After 
confessing to officers that he committed the crime, defendant 
vas extradited to Provo, Utah, vhere he vas tried and con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to death. 
Defendant's original appellate counsel filed tvo 
briefs on appeal. After defendemt filed a pro se motion vith 
this Court, replacement counsel vas appointed to brief addi-
tional issues defendant raised. Also, the American Civil 
Liberties Union vas permitted to file an amicus brief in this 
case. 
In reaching the issues on appeal, ve reiterate that 
[t]his Court vill review errors raised and 
briefed on appeal in death penalty cases, 
even though no proper objection vas made 
at trial, but vill reverse a conviction 
based upon such errors only if they meet 
the manifest and prejudicial error 
standard. In addition, this Court has the 
power to notice manifest ('palpable*) 
error apparent in the record and correct a 
conviction based upon the same if the 
error is prejudicial, even though such 
error is not objected to at trial or 
assigned on appeal.1 
In addition to correctly reflecting this Court's 
responsibility and approach in reviewing death penalty cases, 
this rule also impliedly recognizes another established 
principle generally applicable to all civil and criminal 
cases, namely, that this Court need not analyze and address 
in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised 
and properly before us on appeal. Rather, it is a maxim of 
appellate review that the nature and extent of an opinion 
rendered by an appellate court is largely discretionary with 
that court.2 
This was essentially the view of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court in stating: 
It is our duty to decide all cases brought 
before us, but whether a written opinion 
shall be filed is entirely within our 
discretion. A failure to do so is in no 
sense a reflection upon counsel, nor is it 
any criterion as to the ability or learn-
ing with which the case may have been 
argued. It simply means that we do not 
think it necessary. . . . If the essen-
tial principles upon which a case depends 
have been already settled, we can add but 
little, if anything, to what has already 
been said; while the discussion of ques-
tions not essential to its determination, 
even if argued by counsel, may well be 
omitted in the interest of time and space.3 
Similarly, in holding that California's constitution 
did not require its appellate courts to 'set forth and 
dispose of, seriatim, each and every item which appellant's 
counsel chooses to characterize as an 'issue' in the case,' 
the California Court of Appeals eloquently stated: 
T. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 (Utah 1987) (emphasis 
added; footnotes omitted). 
2. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal 4 Error, f 901, at 338 and cases 
cited therein. 
3. Parker v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 133 N.C. 335, 337, 45 
S.E. 658, 658 (1903)} cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 90 Ariz. 379, 381, 368 P.2d 450, 452 (1962) (en banc) 
(*[T]he decision need not contain a seriatim rebuttal of 
points made or arguments advanced. Enlargements upon the 
ground of decision ought to be limited to matters where areas 
of genuine dispute exist.*)* 
Our statement that these other 
contentions 'did not merit discussion' is 
an indication that we necessarily and 
carefully analyzed the contentions in 
order to reach that conclusion. . . . 
In an era in which there is concern 
that the quality of justice is being 
diminished by appellate backlog with its 
attendant delay, which in turn contributes 
to a lack of finality of judgment, it 
behooves us as an appellate court to "get 
to the heart" of cases presented and 
dispose of them expeditiously. Unneces-
sary verbiage and redundant literary 
exercises are counter-productive.4 
In applying this principle to cases before us, we 
have, after fully considering the substance of a particular 
claim raised on appeal, summarily (and often without written 
analysis) dismissed the same as meritless or of no effect.5 
Use of this rule in capital punishment and other cases 
continues to be appropriate and important in acknowledging 
established principles while enabling this Court, after fair 
and comprehensive review, to expeditiously focus judicial 
resources and energy on those critical or outcome-
determinative issues which may be raised in any given case 
and/or which have not in substance been previously urged upon 
this Court and rejected.6 Accordingly, after fully reviewing 
every claim raised in the instant case, we discuss at length 
only those issues critical to this appeal.7 
4k People v. Rojas, 118 Cal. App. 3d 278, 290, 174 Cal. 
Rptr. 91, 92-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); cf^ Ex parte Royall, 
117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (*'[T]o dispose of the party as law 
and justice require' does not deprive the court of discretion 
as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers 
conferred upon it." (Emphasis added.)) (federal court's 
power in habeas corpus cases to deal with federal constitu-
tional violation of defendant held in state custody). 
5. See, e.g.. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 460, 489 (Utah 
1988) (defendant's claims reviewed and dismissed without 
lengthy analysis); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1261 
(Utah 1988) ("We have considered every one of [defendant's] 
other claims and find each of them to be without merit."). 
6. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 460; cf^ Utah R. Crim. P. 26(10) 
(death sentence cases shall be placed on the Supreme Court's 
calendar for expeditious determination). 
7. Although in raising his claims defendant relies on both 
the United States and Utah Constitutions, he does not 
(Continued on page 4.) 
a No. 860063 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not 
suppressing his confession. Several months after the murder 
occurred, Tennessee police officers received information from 
an anonymous source that defendant was at a female friend's 
Nashville residence. After confirming that defendant was 
wanted in connection with the case, officers proceeded to the 
friend's residence and there arrested defendant. 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, a 
Nashville police officer testified that he gave defendant a 
Miranda warning after arresting him. At the police station 
later that day, he again advised defendant of his Miranda 
rights and obtained a written waiver of those rights from 
him. The officer then questioned defendant for several hours 
over the next two days; during those times, defendant was 
allowed to smoke, drink water, and use restroom facilities. 
The officer testified that he did not threaten 
defendant. He also denied that he used the friend's situation 
or that of her children in any manner to intimidate defendant 
into confessing, stating that he offered information about 
her status only in response to defendant's frequent questions 
regarding her. 
A police officer from the Provo police department 
was sent to Tennessee to extradite defendant. At the 
suppression hearing, the Provo officer testified that when he 
interviewed defendant in Tennessee, he advised defendant of 
his Miranda rights and soon obtained a confession from him. 
Thereafter, the officer apparently dictated the confession, 
stopping after every few lines to ask defendant whether what 
was dictated was accurate. The confession was then reduced 
to writing and signed. Although acknowledging at the 
suppression hearing that he had interviewed defendant's 
friend prior to questioning defendant, the officer denied 
making any threats or promises to defendant concerning her. 
In contrast, defendant testified that he never 
received Miranda warnings from the Nashville or the Provo 
officer and that he could not recall signing written waivers 
of his constitutional rights. Defendant did acknowledge, 
however, that his signature appeared to be on documents 
waiving those rights* On appeal, he reiterates his claim 
that the officers repeatedly threatened that his friend 
(Footnote 7 continued.) 
specifically contend that the state and federal analyses 
differ* Therefore, pursuant to our prescribed standard of 
review in death penalty cases, we treat defendant's claims as 
based only upon federal constitutional provisions. See 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1247 n.5 (citing State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1257 11.2 (Utah 1987)). 
would be charged with a felony, go to prison, and be separated 
from her children unless he confessed. 
In State v. Bishop,e we recently noted that the 
State bears the burden of proving by at least a preponderance 
of the evidence that a defendant's confession is voluntary.9 
Voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circum-
stances of the accused and his or her interrogation.10 
Applying this standard, we have examined the record and 
reviewed the totality of the circumstances and now conclude 
that defendant's statements were voluntarily made.11 The 
trial court was presented with significantly different 
accounts of the circumstances of defendant's confession. 
However, defendant has not shown that the court abused its 
discretion in assessing the evidence presented and drawing a 
reasonable conclusion therefrom.12 
Defendant further claims that the court erred in 
admitting his confession, given the manner in which it was 
dictated. He also contends that the prosecutor's statements 
which attributed to defendant the specific words of the 
confession that the Provo officer dictated undermined his 
constitutional right not to testify and denied the court a 
true version of his statement, all of which substantially 
prejudiced his trial. 
After reviewing the record, we are convinced that 
there is no proof to support a determination that any 
significant item was omitted from the statement, that 
defendant's rights were violated, or that he was prejudiced 
by the prosecutor's comments. In fact, defendant's own 
detailed statements to two other witnesses immediately after 
the crime parallel and substantially support the confession 
given to the police. Further, defendant signed the document, 
and he was not denied a full and fair opportunity to cross-
examine the officers concerning the accuracy of the writing 
as a reflection of his oral confession.13 
8. 753 P.2d 439. 
9. Id^ at 463-64. 
10. Id. 
11. Id^ at 464 & n.76. 
12. Id^ at 463-64; State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 392 (Utah 
1986)• 
13. United States v. Johnson, 529 F.2d 581, 584-85 (8th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 909 (1976) ("A statement which 
is reduced to writing by one other than the accused is 
generally admissible where the accused reads it over and 
signs it."); Hommer v. State, 657 P.2d 172, 175 (Ofcla. Crim. 
App. 1983) (defendant did not allege or prove that any 
significant item was omitted from statement, and defendant 
signed the document as her statement of confession) f see also 
(Continued on page 6.) 
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While we hold that admission of the confession was 
not prejudicial error, we do not sanction the particular 
manner in which it was recorded in this case. In Bishop, 
that defendant's confession, together with statements made by 
the police officers, was recorded verbatim. This process not 
only helped insure that the defendant's confession was not 
coerced, but also provided both the trial court and appellate 
courts with the correct tools for effectively and efficiently 
reviewing the defendant's contentions, as well as the 
totality of the circumstances of his confession.14 Such a 
process guarantees that constitutional rights are protected 
and justice is effected. Nevertheless, while the dictation 
process that occurred in this case could conceivably amount, 
in other instances, to deprivation of a defendant's consti-
tutional rights, that was not the case here. 
Next, we turn to defendant's claim that the 
prosecutor indirectly commented on defendant's failure to 
testify at trial and suggested to the jury that his silence 
implied guilt. Defendant refers to the following comment 
which the prosecutor made in his summation to the jury during 
the guilt phase of trial: 
I heard no evidence, evidence, [sic] from 
the witness stand about coercion or about 
inducing somebody to say anything about 
something that didn't happen. I heard no 
evidence that supports any other theory in 
this case than the theory that was pre-
sented by the State of Utah, that he's 
guilty of first degree murder. 
As noted in State v. Tillman,15 a prosecutor's 
direct reference to a defendant's decision not to testify is 
always a violation of that defendant's fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination. Indirect reference to a 
defendant's failure to testify is also constitutionally 
impermissible if the comment was manifestly intended to be or 
was of such a character that the jury would naturally and 
necessarily construe it to be a comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify.16 
While clearly not a direct reference, we do not 
believe after reviewing the record that the statement in 
question would naturally and necessarily be construed by the 
(Footnote 13 continued.) 
State v. Morris, 83 Or. App. 429, 441-42, 163 P. 567, 571 
(1917) (by signing and adopting language of prepared 
confession, defendant makes it his own). 
14. See generally Bishop, 753 P. 2d at 460-67. 
15. 750 P.2d 546. 
16. Id. at 554. 
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jury as a comment on defendant's silence. Indeed, the 
comment was made in the context of focusing the jury's 
attention on defendant's confession, which, under the 
circumstances of this case, ve have concluded was properly 
admitted. Also, the passage quoted could refer to the lack 
of any evidence elicited from witnesses or from officers 
present during defendant's confession contradicting the 
State's theory of the case. Lastly, the statement was 
isolated, and the trial judge specifically instructed the 
jury that *[t]he fact that [defendant] has not taken the 
witness stand must not be taken as an indication of his 
guilt, nor should you indulge in any presumption or inference 
adverse to [him] by reason thereof." Accordingly, defendant's 
claim is without merit.17 
Defendant elsewhere contends that he was prejudiced 
by the court's decision to allow the Provo officer to remain 
at the prosecution table throughout the proceedings and to 
then testify for the State although the exclusionary rule was 
in effect. 
Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
At the request of a party the court 
shall order witnesses excluded so that 
they cannot hear the testimony of other 
witnesses, and it may make the order of 
its own motion. This rule does not 
authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is 
a natural person, or (2) an officer or 
employee of a party which is not a natural 
person designated as its representative by 
its attorney, or (3) a person whose pres-
ence is shown by a party to be essential 
to the presentation of his cause. 
On appeal, defendant neither specifically contends 
that the officer's presence at counsel table during trial 
offended the purpose of the exclusionary rule nor explicitly 
claims that the officer's presence did not properly meet the 
"party representative" exception to the exclusionary prin-
ciples enumerated in rule 615(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence.18 Instead, he surmises that he was prejudiced by 
_
 S e e Tillman, 750 P.2d at 555. 
18. Immediately after the jury was selected, defendant moved 
to invoke the exclusionary rule. Informed that the officer 
would testify as a witness for the prosecution, the trial 
court acknowledged and defendant acquiesced in the fact that 
the officer was the designated representative of the State in 
this case, and the court allowed him to sit at counsel 
table. The court stated: 
(Continued on page 8.) 
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the fact that the officer's presence possibly indicated to 
the jury that the government placed its integrity and 
prestige behind that witness, thus vouching for his 
credibility. We disagree. 
Our above-noted rule is identical to rule 615 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which has been interpreted by many 
federal courts. In United States v. Williams,1* the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held: 
Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
does not authorize the exclusion of a 
government officer or employee who has 
been designated as its representative. 
Further, it is a matter within the 
discretion of the trial court whether to 
permit the government's representative to 
testify, even though the witness sat at 
the counsel's table throughout the trial. 
In the absence of any specific showing of 
prejudice to [the defendant] from the 
action of the trial court, we find no 
abuse of discretion.20 
(Footnote 18 continued.) 
I understand, Officer Pierpont you 
want to keep with you at the table, do 
you, [Prosecutor) Watson? 
Mr. Watson: Yes, please, your Honor. 
The Court: All right, all of you 
[witnesses] other than Officer Pierpont, 
who are present in the court, if you will 
please step outside the court. 
Thereafter, the court explained the purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule and admonished the witnesses concerning its scope. 
Regarding the officer, the court noted, "The State is entitled 
to keep one principal witness at the counsel table.' While 
this latter statement did not accurately describe the 
officer's designation as the State's representative under 
rule 615, the court did not err in permitting him to remain in 
the courtroom and testify in this case. See infra notes 20-21 
and accompanying text. Inasmuch as the scope and applicability 
of rule 615(2) and (3) are not before us for review, we do not 
address additional issues related thereto. 
19. 604 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1979). 
20. Id. at 1115 (citations omitted); see also United States 
v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 773-74 (4th Cir. 1983) (a government 
investigative agent involved in a criminal prosecution falls 
within the rule 615 exception); United States v. Jones, 687 
F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (8th Cir. 1982) (*[T]here is nothing in the 
cases or legislative history of the rule that suggests state 
or local officers should be treated differently than federal 
(Continued on page 9.) 
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Also, in regard to prosecutorial vouching for 
witnesses, it has been stated: 
"Attempts to bolster a witness by vouching 
for his credibility are normally improper 
and error." The test for improper 
vouching is whether the jury could 
reasonably believe that the prosecutor was 
indicating a personal belief in the 
witness' credibility. This test may be 
satisfied in two ways. Pirst, the 
prosecution may place the prestige of the 
government behind the witness, by making 
explicit personal assurances of the 
witness' credibility. Secondly, a 
prosecutor may implicitly vouch for the 
witness veracity by indicating that 
information not presented to the jury 
supports the testimony.21 
In view of the above principles, defendant has not 
demonstrated how he was actually prejudiced by the fact that 
the officer sat at counsel table and testified for the State 
or how defendant's particular situation justifies a change 
from the established rule in such cases. Also, defendant has 
not alleged and we find no support for a conclusion that the 
prosecution cloaked the officer with the State's integrity 
and prestige by either making "explicit personal assurances" 
of his veracity or indicating that information not presented 
to the jury supported his testimony.22 Accordingly, we 
conclude that defendant was not prejudiced and the trial 
(Footnote 20 continued.) 
officers."); People v. Cheeks, 682 P.2d 484, 485-86 (Colo. 
1984) (the rule which governs sequestration prohibits 
exclusion of an officer or an employee of a nonnatural party 
who has been designated as its representative); cf. Geders v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) ("The judge's power to 
control the progress and, within the limits of the adversary 
system, the shape of the trial includes broad power to 
sequester witnesses before, during, and after their 
testimony."). 
21. United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 377-78 (11th Cir. 
1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984) (citations omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Bills, 547 F.2d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 
1977)), quoted in United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029, 1046 
(11th Cir. 1986); accord United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 
530, 533-34 (9th Cir* 1980), quoted in State v. Salcido, 140 
Ariz. 342, 344, 681 P.2d 925, 927 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Cf. 
Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 557, 196 P. 2d 968, 975 
(1948) (civil case stating general rule that a party who calls 
a witness thereby vouches for his or her veracity). 
22• Sims, 719 F.2d at 377-78. 
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court did not err in allowing the officer to sit at counsel 
table and testify at trial in this case.23 
He next address defendant's claim that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel in violation of both his 
state and federal constitutional rights. In Strickland v, 
Washington,24 the United States Supreme Court established the 
standard for determining the existence of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel at trial. In order to prevail on such a 
claim, a defendant must show, first, that his or her counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective standard of reason-
able professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant.25 This Court has 
applied that standard in several cases.26 In several of 
those cases, we followed one course advised but not 
required27 by the Court in Strickland: 
[A] court need not determine whether 
counsel's performance was deficient before 
examining the prejudice suffered by the 
defendant as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies. . . • If it is easier to 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, 
which we expect will often be so, that 
course should be followed. Courts should 
strive to ensure that ineffectiveness 
claims not become so burdensome to defense 
23. See State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) 
(clearly erroneous standard of review applies in considering 
trial court's ruling on admissibility of testimonial and other 
evidence). 
24. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
25. Id^ at 687-88. 
26. See, e.g., State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191-92 (Utah 
1988); State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1023-24 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); 
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). 
27. Strickland does not require that a defendant claiming 
ineffective assistance must show that the conduct prejudiced 
his case before the reviewing court will consider whether 
specific conduct falls below the required standard of 
objective reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
While this Court may choose at times to~deal with ineffective 
assistance claims by first reviewing the likely-prejudice-of-
the-outcome issue, that decision does not prevent this Court 
in other instances from first considering the issue of whether 
specific conduct falls below the required standard of 
objective reasonableness. Any implications to the contrary 
are in error* See, e.g., Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023; 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
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counsel that the entire criminal justice 
system suffers as a result.28 
After reviewing defendant's asserted claims of error 
in this regard, we conclude that most of his allegations of 
prejudice are wholly speculative29 and in no way give rise to 
the conclusion that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different."30 
Additionally, defendant has not sufficiently shown how the 
decisions made by trial counsel were not merely tactical 
choices or how counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment.31 Other claims 
are clearly not supported by the record. For example, there 
is no support for the contention that counsel failed to 
elicit evidence relevant to whether defendant was afforded 
his sixth amendment right to counsel at the time his con-
fession was taken. Instead, defendant twice acknowledged and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Documents to this 
effect stated in part: 
You have the right to talk to a 
lawyer for advice before we ask you any 
questions and to have him with you during 
questioning. 
28. 466 U.S. at 697. 
29. In Frame, 723 F.2d at 406, the Court noted: 
Defendant claims that he was 
inadequately prepared as a witness and 
that no other witnesses were called on 
his behalf. These contentions are also 
inadequately supported on appeal. Defen-
dant does not explain how his testimony or 
the purported lack of advance preparation 
was prejudicial to him. He does not 
explain what his testimony would have been 
had he been adequately prepared. Also, 
defendant does not identify what other 
persons should have been called as 
witnesses or how their testimony was 
essential to his defense. 
(Citations omitted.) 
30. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) ("[Prejudice means 
that without counsel#8 error there was a 'reasonable 
likelihood that there would have been a different result." 
(Quoting State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979)). 
31. Supra note 25; State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 
1982) ("Trial tactics lie within the prerogative of counsel 
and may not be dictated by his [or her] client. Decisions as 
to what witnesses to call, what objections to make, and, by 
and large, what defenses to interpose are generally left to 
the professional judgment of counsel."), cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 988 (1982). 
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If you cannot afford a lawyer, one 
will be appointed for you before any 
questioning if you wish. If you decide to 
answer questions now without a lawyer 
present, you will still have the right to 
stop answering at any tine. You also have 
the right to stop answering at any time 
until you talk to a lawyer. 
Waiver of Rights 
I have read this statement of my 
rights and I understand what my rights 
are. I am willing to make a statement and 
answer questions. I do not want a lawyer 
at this time. I understand and know what 
I am doing. No promises or threats have 
been made to me and no pressure or 
coercion of any kind has been used against 
me. 
Defendant signed these statements, indicating that he had 
been afforded his sixth amendment right to counsel at the 
time his confession was taken, and he noted at the 
preliminary hearing that the signatures appeared to be his 
own. Accordingly, defendant's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are, for the most part, without merit. 
Notwithstanding the above, we conclude that manifest 
error was committed during the penalty phase. In State v. 
Wood,32 we held that "[i]n a capital penalty proceeding, it 
is essential that the sentencing authority consider and weigh 
only proper mitigating and aggravating factors.*33 In that 
case, the trial court during the penalty phase relied upon 
the ruthlessness and brutality of the murder as an aggra-
vating factor in the weighing process. The sentencing judge 
had considered the factor under the general provision in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1988) authorizing the trier of 
fact to consider "any other facts in aggravation or mitiga-
tion of the penalty.* Despite that statutory language, we 
ruled that consideration of such an indefinite and uncertain 
standard as "ruthlessness and brutality" was impermissible.34 
In doing so, we cited Godfrey v. Georgia35 as support. 
Therein, the United States Supreme Court set aside a death 
sentence based on an aggravating factor that the murder was 
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman." 
Godfrey held that the aggravating factor had to be narrowed 
to meet constitutional standards because it described all 
32. 648 P.2d 71. 
33. Id. at 85. 
34. Id. at 86; see also State v. Tuttle, 106 Utah Adv. 6 
(April 12, 1989). 
35. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
murders and allowed the jury unlimited discretion in imposing 
the death penalty.36 
After ve issued our opinion in Wood, the legislature 
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (Supp. 1988) ('sub-
section (l)(g)")# apparently to avoid such constitutional 
infirmity. That subsection classifies criminal homicide as 
first degree murder when the homicide is "committed in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally 
depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by 
physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily 
injury of the victim before death." (Emphasis added.) 
At trial in the instant case, the jury was 
instructed that it could convict defendant of first degree 
murder if it found that the intentional or knowing homicide 
was "committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or 
exceptionally depraved manner." It was never properly 
instructed in either the guilt or the penalty phase that Utah 
law expressly requires that such factor "must be demonstrated 
by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious 
bodily injury of the victim before death." The jury then 
determined that the murder was committed "in an especially 
heinous, atrocious, cruel or exceptionally depraved manner." 
During the penalty phase, the jury was instructed that it 
could consider the aggravating factors it had already found 
in the guilt phase in determining the appropriate penalty. 
Defendant now claims that the failure to properly instruct 
the jury during the guilt phase permitted them to improperly 
find the existence of the subsection (1)(q) aggravating 
circumstance and to then consider that erroneous finding when 
determining the penalty. This, defendant claims, was 
manifest error. 
In response, the State concedes that failure to 
properly instruct the jury invalidated the jury's reliance on 
subsection (1)(q) as a basis for finding defendant guilty of 
capital murder. However, as the State properly notes, this 
instructional error does not require reversal of defendant's 
first degree murder conviction since the jury, in addition to 
finding the existence of the subsection (1)(q) circumstance, 
specifically found that the murder was also committed in 
connection with an aggravated burglary under subsection 
76-5-202(1)(d). This determination alone was sufficient to 
support defendant's conviction.37 
The issue is different, however, when the death 
sentence imposed by the jury in the penalty hearing is 
36. 446 U.S. at 428-29, 433; Wood, 648 P.2d at 86. 
37. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 478-79; State v. Johnson, 740 
P.2d 1264, 1268 (Utah 1987); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 
1307 (Utah 1986). 
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considered. Defendant claims that there is a reasonable 
probability that absent the erroneous finding of the 
subsection (1)(q) circumstance, the jury would not have 
imposed the death penalty. The defense contends that this 
uncertainty must invalidate defendant's death sentence. He 
agree under the circumstances of this case. 
During the penalty phase, the jury was instructed in 
part that it could 
consider as aggravating circumstances the 
very matters which were aggravating 
circumstances in the guilt phase, 
specifically that the defendant committed 
the murder of Eva Oleson during the 
commission of or an attempt to commit 
aggravated burglary and that the murder 
was committed in an especially heinous, 
atrocious and cruel manner. 
This language, reinforced by comments of the prosecutor 
during the penalty phase, can be viewed as explicitly 
instructing the jury to consider the subsection (1)(q) 
circumstance previously found to exist during the guilt phase 
on the basis of the erroneous instruction. In view of this 
fact, the sentencing jury, due to the infirmity of the 
instructions on subsection (1)(q), was likely unable to 
exercise its judgment about "the suitable disposition of 
• . . defendant under the circumstances particular to him and 
his crime, after the facts establishing his guilt have been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."38 In effect, then, the 
improper instructions denied this jury the opportunity to 
properly determine whether the mitigating factors were 
"sufficiently strong when compared with the aggravating 
factors to create a substantial and reasonable doubt that the 
death penalty is appropriate."39 
Importantly, a fundamental objective of this Court 
in such cases is to protect against "the imposition of a 
death penalty where there existed a reasonable doubt about 
the pervasive value of and weight to be given to the miti-
gating factors found bv the trial court as opposed to the 
aggravating factors."*& Given the erroneous instruction, it 
is impossible for us to determine or presume that the jury 
properly performed its weighing function. Because we cannot 
conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the subsection 
Wl State v. Andrews, 677 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1983). 
39. Id. at 83 (quoting Wood, 648 P.2d at 78); cf. Maynard v. 
Cartwrlght, 486 U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988) (as applied 
in the case, the statutory aggravating circumstance was 
unconstitutionally vague). 
40. Andrews, 677 P.2d at 84. 
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(1)(g) instructional error and its effective incorporation 
into the penalty phase, ve remand for new sentencing pro-
ceedings.*1 In doing so, it is to be observed that in State 
v. Tuttle,42 decided after the submission of this case, we 
also discussed the application of subsection (1)(q). However, 
that case does not apply here since we conclude that the jury 
was not properly instructed on the subsection (1)(g) 
aggravating circumstance at the guilt phase and it would be 
improper to make reference to that statutory aggravating 
circumstance in the penalty phase on remand. 
We have reviewed defendant's other claims raised on 
appeal and find them to be without merit. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
41. Utah Code Ann. f 76-3-207(4) (Supp. 1988). 
42. 106 Utah Adv. Rap. 6 (April 12, 1989). 
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